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1INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Curiae are academics in law, medicine, health 
policy and clinical genetics. Collectively, they have 
advised the governments of the United States, Canada 
and Australia, as well as international governmental 
organizations including the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the World Health 
Organization on human gene patents and life science 
innovation. Specifi cally, they chaired a task force of the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and 
Society on human gene patents, testifi ed before Congress 
on genetic testing, drafted guidelines for the OECD on 
the licensing of genetic inventions, prepared a report 
for the OECD on IP management in the life sciences, 
drafted reports for the U.S. Congress, prepared multiple 
case studies on gene patenting in the United States and 
prepared submissions to Australian law reform inquiries 
into gene patenting. 
Dr. E. Richard Gold, LLB, S.J.D., is a James McGill 
Professor in the Faculty of Law at McGill University. He 
has authored an extensive case study of Myriad Genetics 
and its patenting policies and was the Expert Consultant 
1.  The parties were given at least ten days notice of amici’s 
intention to fi le a brief. The petitioners have fi led a letter of blanket 
consent to fi ling amicus briefs and letter is lodged with the Clerk. 
The respondents granted consent to the amici on December 29, 
2011 via electronic mail. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, the 
amici submitting this brief and their counsel hereby represent 
that no party to this case nor their counsel authored this brief 
in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici, using 
research funds provided by VALGEN, paid for or made a monetary 
contribution toward the preparation and submission of this brief.
2who drafted the OECD Guidelines on the Licensing 
of Genetic Inventions. He practiced law in the areas 
intellectual property licensing and fi nancing of small to 
medium technology companies and has provided judicial 
education in the United States, Canada and France 
on questions of intellectual property, property and the 
life sciences. He also heads intellectual property and 
technology transfer research within the Value Addition 
through Genomics and GE3LS (VALGEN), a publicly 
financed research project on agriculture and crop 
biotechnology.
Dr. James P. Evans, M.D., Ph.D., is Bryson 
Distinguished Professor of Genetics and Medicine in the 
School of Medicine at the University of North Carolina. He 
is a board certifi ed Medical Geneticist and Internist with 
extensive clinical and research expertise in the area of 
genetics and genetic testing, including the analysis of the 
BRCA1/2 genes in both the research and clinical setting. 
He chaired the Task Force that laid the groundwork for 
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact 
on Patient Access to Genetic Testing: Report of the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and 
Society (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
April 2010). He is also the editor-in-chief of Genetics in 
Medicine, the journal of the American College of Medical 
Genetics.
Dr. Tania Bubela, Ph.D., J.D., is Associate Professor 
of health and intellectual property law in the School of 
Public Health at the University of Alberta. She has written 
and consulted extensively on the commercialization of 
genomics research and the process of technology transfer. 
She has active research grants in the fi elds of mouse 
3models for human disease, synthetic biology and DNA 
barcoding. She leads a publicly funded research project on 
legal, economic and institutional barriers to translational 
stem cell research.
Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, M.D., is Director of Genome 
Ethics, Law and Policy at the Institute for Genome 
Sciences and Policy at Duke University.  He is also a 
Research Professor of Public Policy, of Medicine, and of 
Biology.  He helped co-found the DNA Patent Database at 
Georgetown University, and was the principal investigator 
for a series of case studies on the impact of patenting and 
licensing on clinical access to genetic testing prepared for 
the U.S. Secretary’s Advisory Committee for Genetics, 
Health and Society (noted above).
Dr. Dianne Nicol, Ph.D., L.L.M., is a Professor of 
Law in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tasmania, 
Australia and Deputy Director of the Centre for Law and 
Genetics, based at the University of Tasmania. She has 
conducted research and written extensively on intellectual 
property in biotechnology and commercialization of 
biomedical research. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
 Certiorari is required to correct legal errors 
introduced by the Federal Circuit that will cause 
uncertainty not only in the fi eld of human clinical genetics 
but across the life sciences generally. The majority’s 
decision confl icts with decisions of this Court, most notably 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) and Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). This case also provides 
the Court with the opportunity to develop its holding in 
4Bilski, which called for a subtle understanding of the 
relationship between 35 U.S.C. § 101 and §§ 102, 103, 
and 112.
 The Federal Circuit introduced confusion into the 
determination of patent eligibility under § 101 in at least 
four respects: (1) it introduced a bright-line test of covalent 
bond-breaking for patent eligibility of naturally occurring 
biological molecules; (2) it set out two confl icting tests of 
the meaning of “markedly different” under this Court’s 
holding in Chakrabarty; (3) it assessed the claims from the 
point of view of a chemist when the patent applicant had 
specifi cally set out the fi eld of art as being genetics; and 
(4) it overrode the majority of judges on the panel because 
of expectations settled by administrative, not legal, rules.
 Because the effects of this decision will be felt in 
many areas of the life sciences in which natural molecules 
are involved, it is critical that this Court provide guidance 
in line with its decision in Bilski on the application of § 101 
to natural molecules and the important role that § 101 
plays in facilitating substantive analysis under §§ 102, 
103, and 112.
ARGUMENT
 Certiorari is required in this case to correct the 
introduction by the Federal Circuit of a bright-line, yet 
scientifi cally incoherent test, for patentability under 35 
U.S.C.  § 101. This Court’s holding in Bilski calls for a more 
subtle analysis of § 101 than was given by the majority in 
the Federal Circuit. This appeal presents the Court with 
an opportunity to explore the relationship it described in 
Bilski between the threshold test for patentable subject-
matter under § 101 and the more substantive analyses to 
5be undertaken under §§ 102, 103, and 112.
I. THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
I N T R O D U C E S  C O N F U S I O N  I N T O  A N 
IMPORTANT AREA OF FEDERAL LAW
The Federal Circuit introduced signifi cant uncertainty 
into determinations of the patent-eligibility of biological 
molecules under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act. As 
naturally occurring biological molecules are ubiquitous 
not only in clinical genetics but in the life sciences 
generally—including medicine, agriculture, aquaculture, 
tree biotechnology, industrial biotechnology and new 
forms of energy—the majority’s decision sows confusion 
in a critical area of federal law with effects across many 
industries throughout the United States.
In particular, the majority in the Federal Circuit 
creates the following four forms of uncertainty:
1. It asserts an arbitrary and scientifi cally illegitimate 
defi ning boundary between the claimed invention 
and nature: the cleavage of a covalent bond 
(App. at 48a (“But a covalent bond is the defi ning 
boundary between one molecule and another”).) 
There is nothing unique regarding the importance 
of covalent bonds in chemistry or biology. Indeed, 
other types of bonds—such as the hydrogen bonds 
linking base pairs on opposing DNA strands that 
are critical for both replication and transcription 
and the ionic bonds that link histones to the DNA 
backbone that are essential to transcription—are 
at least as important. Hydrogen bonds between 
purines and pyrimidines, in particular, are features 
6of DNA structure that are taught in textbooks as 
essential to its biological function.
2. It sets out confl icting criteria to determine whether 
a claimed invention constitutes eligible subject-
matter under § 101. The majority opinion of Judge 
Lourie took the position that a structural difference 
between the claimed matter and natural product was 
suffi cient to meet the requirements of § 101 whereas 
both the concurring opinion of Judge Moore and the 
dissent of Judge Bryson stated that the claimed matter 
must be both structurally and functionally different 
from a natural product to so qualify. 
3. It assesses patent eligibility of claims from the point 
of view of a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA) of chemistry rather than of genetics, 
despite the clear application of the claimed invention 
in the life sciences and the specifi c statement of the 
patent applicant;
4. Because of its reliance on the concurring opinion of 
Judge Moore, the majority in the Federal Circuit 
overrides a majority of the judges in the Federal 
Circuit who found that isolated DNA sequences of 
most or all of a gene were prima facie not patentable 
subject-matter under § 101.
A. Cleavage of a Covalent Bond as Test for Patent-
Eligibility Introduces Uncertainty
The majority of the Federal Circuit held that the 
claimed isolated DNA molecules were chemically 
distinctive from DNA in the human body (App. at 46a) 
7because Myriad had cleaved “a covalent bond [which] is 
the defi ning boundary between one molecule and another.” 
(App. at 48a.) This argument introduces a test of patent 
eligibility under § 101—the breaking of covalent bonds—
that is inappropriate and sows confusion in determining 
which naturally occurring biological molecules, in fi elds 
well beyond clinical human genetics, are eligible to be 
patented.
The Federal Circuit failed to provide a reason that 
covalent, rather than other types of bond—in particular 
ionic and hydrogen bonds—are the features that 
distinguish what is patentable from that which is not 
patentable. The majority’s only explanation is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of a seminal 1960s text on 
chemistry: “But a covalent bond is the defi ning boundary 
between one molecule and another. The dissent’s citation 
of Linus Pauling’s comment that covalent bonds ‘make it 
convenient for the chemist to consider [the aggregate] as 
an independent molecular species’ underlines the point.” 
(App. at 48a.)
The majority’s misreading of Pauling actually proves 
the point opposite to that it was making. Pauling was 
talking of chemical bonds in general—which also include 
ionic and hydrogen bonds—rather than only covalent 
bonds. The actual quote from Pauling is “that there is 
a chemical bond between two atoms or groups of atoms 
in case that the forces acting between them are such as 
to lead to the formation of an aggregate with suffi cient 
stability to make it convenient for the chemist to consider 
it as an independent molecular species.” LINUS PAULING, 
THE NATURE OF THE CHEMICAL BOND AND THE STRUCTURE 
8OF MOLECULES AND CRYSTALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN 
STRUCTURAL CHEMISTRY  6 (3d ed. 1960) (emphasis added). 
Pauling defi ned chemical bond on the previous page as 
including “electrostatic bonds [which include both ionic 
and hydrogen bonds], covalent bonds and metallic bonds.” 
Id. at 5. 
Indeed, hydrogen bonds, and not covalent bonds, are 
the defi ning characteristic of DNA. While covalent bonds 
certainly play an important role in biology, and provide 
DNA chemical stability as the repository of genetic 
information, other bonds are of specifi c signifi cance in 
the fi eld of genetics. The essence of DNA, its information-
carrying capacity and its ability to replicate, is directly 
dependent upon hydrogen bonds that link the base pairs 
in opposing strands.  It is an antisymmetrical double helix 
precisely and only because of hydrogen bonds, not the 
covalent bonds in the backbone. Similarly, the ability of 
DNA to copy itself (replication) and the transcription of 
DNA into RNA rely both on hydrogen bonds and the ionic 
bonds connecting histones and DNA-binding proteins that 
turn on and off transcription. 
Even the concurring opinion expressed doubt as to 
whether the cleavage of covalent bonds was suffi cient to 
establish the patent eligibility of isolated DNA sequences: 
“If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might 
conclude that an isolated DNA sequence that includes 
most or all of a gene is not patentable subject matter.” 
(App. at 79a.)
The problem with the majority’s decision is far deeper, 
however, than the arbitrariness with which it highlighted 
the role of covalent bonds over other types of bond: the 
9majority failed to provide a substantive rationale of why 
the cleavage of any bond should be the key to determining 
patent-eligibility under § 101. It cited no cases to support 
this decision and failed to consider the effect of its novel 
test on the patentability of other naturally occurring 
biological molecules, such as proteins, and other naturally 
occurring structures, such as cell lines.  Claims reading 
over isolated proteins would seemingly fail the majority’s 
test as no covalent bond would normally be cleaved. This 
would have a profound effect not only in the limited area 
of human clinical genetics, but across all of biology from 
regenerative medicine (e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,057,788 (fi led 
Dec. 28, 2006), directed to placental stem cells, assigned 
to the Anthrogenesis Corporation of New Jersey); to 
agriculture (e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,067,669 (fi led Mar. 5, 
2010), directed to a protein to inhibit soya rust, assigned 
to The University of Missouri); industrial applications (e.g., 
U.S. Patent No. 8,034,600 (fi led Aug. 5, 2008), directed to 
a protein used in starch and alcohol production, cleansing 
and textiles, assigned to Danisco U.S. of California); 
and energy (e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,004,264 (fi led Sept. 
23, 2008), directed to proteins that enhance the use of 
wood, agricultural crops and other organic materials into 
ethanol, assigned to Novozymes, Inc. of California).
None of this Court’s decisions would call for the bright-
line test developed by the majority in the Federal Circuit. 
This Court has repeatedly warned against the use of 
arbitrary tests in the application of § 101 (see e.g., Bilski). 
The majority’s decision violates this rule, introducing a 
test for patent-eligibility that is not only unsupported by 
legislation, case law or scientifi c principle, but that creates 
signifi cant uncertainty over the patent-eligibility of a 
large range of naturally occurring biological molecules.
10
B. Conflicting Tests for Patentable Subject-
Matter under § 101
While the majority opinion found isolated DNA 
sequences to constitute patentable subject-matter under 
§ 101, the two members of the majority disagreed on the legal 
rule to be used in arriving at this decision, sowing further 
confusion for the application of this rule in the future.
Judge Lourie, in the majority decision, interpreted 
this Court’s decision in Chakrabarty as drawing “a line 
between compositions that, even if combined or altered 
in a manner not found in nature, and compositions that 
human intervention has given ‘markedly different,’ or 
‘distinctive,’ characteristics.” (App. at 45a.) He then gave 
an interpretation of “markedly different” and “distinctive” 
that reduced the meaning of these terms to require a 
structural difference, even if not directly relevant to 
what renders the invention inventive: “We disagree, as 
it is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated 
compositions of matter that determines their patent 
eligibility rather than their physiological use or benefi t.” 
(App. at 49a.)
 Both the concurring opinion and the dissent 
interpreted Chakrabarty more in line with its literal 
meaning, as requiring more than a mere structural 
difference between the claimed invention and naturally 
occurring DNA sequences. The concurring opinion noted 
that “[a]lthough the different chemical structure does 
suggest that claimed DNA is not a product of nature, I do 
not think this difference alone necessarily makes isolated 
DNA so ‘markedly different,’ from chromosomal DNA so 
as to be per se patentable subject matter.” (App. at 75a.) 
(citation omitted.)
11
Similarly, the dissent found that a claimed invention 
must exhibit both structural and functional differences 
from natural compositions of matter. “In sum, the test 
employed by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty requires 
us to focus on two things: (1) the similarity in structure 
between what is claimed and what is found in nature and 
(2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and 
what is found in nature.” (App. at 105a.)
 The result of these different opinions is that, while 
the majority of the Federal Circuit held that structural 
differences between a naturally occurring biological 
compound and a claimed invention were suffi cient to meet 
the requirements of § 101, a majority of judges found that 
a functional difference was also required. This outcome 
establishes an impossible set of rules for future courts 
attempting to apply § 101.
C. The Federal Circuit Relies on the Wrong 
PHOSITA
In Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), the Federal Circuit recognized the 
importance of providing context for a claim prior to an 
analysis of its patent-eligibility under § 101. “On many 
occasions, however, a defi nition of the invention via claim 
construction can clarify the basic character of the subject 
matter of the invention. Thus, claim meaning may clarify 
the actual subject matter at stake in the invention and can 
enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject matter 
abstractness.” Id. at 1325.
While the court in Ultramercial did not explicitly 
address whether claim construction for purposes of 
12
patent-eligibility under § 101 follows the general rules of 
claim construction for patent infringement, its clear implication 
was that it did. Nevertheless, the majority in the Federal Circuit 
in the case under appeal chose not the PHOSITA in the fi eld 
specifi cally noted by the patent applicant, nor a scientist in the 
life sciences (a geneticist or biochemist), but a chemist who 
would not be specifi cally knowledgeable about the invention, 
its utility or its import. In so doing, the majority created 
confusion in the construction of life science claims. 
In the case under appeal, the Federal Circuit began 
the process of claim construction by situating the claims 
in light of the understanding that a chemist would bring 
to the claimed invention. “We recognize that biologists 
may think of molecules in terms of their uses, but genes 
are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as 
such, are best described in patents by their structures 
rather than their functions.” (App. at 49a.) Based on 
the understanding of a chemist, the majority held that: 
“Although isolated DNA must be removed from its native 
cellular and chromosomal environment, it has also been 
manipulated chemically so as to produce a molecule that 
is markedly different from that which exists in the body.” 
(App. at 47a.)
While the majority was correct in placing the claim 
within the context of a specifi c art to which it applies, it 
selected the wrong PHOSITA.  As noted by the dissent: 
“[I]f we are to apply the conventional nomenclature of any 
fi eld to determine whether Myriad’s isolated DNA claims 
are ‘new,’ it would seem to make more sense to look to 
genetics, which provides the language of the claims, than 
to chemistry.” (App. at 101a.) 
13
Further, the patent documents prepared by Myriad 
point directly to the field of genetics rather than to 
chemistry. In fact, the opening line in several sections, 
including the abstract and description, of U.S. Patent No. 
5,747,282 (fi led June 7, 1995) states: “The present invention 
relates generally to the fi eld of human genetics.”
The majority’s error in selecting a PHOSITA 
permeates its decision. In particular, it leads the majority 
to the biologically incorrect conclusion that:
It is undisputed that Myriad’s claimed isolated 
DNAs exist in a distinctive chemical form—as 
distinctive chemical molecules—from DNAs 
in the human body, i.e., native DNA. Native 
DNA exists in the body as one of forty-six 
large, contiguous DNA molecules. Each DNA 
molecule is itself an integral part of a larger 
structural complex, a chromosome. In each 
chromosome, the DNA molecule is packaged 
around histone proteins into a structure called 
chromatin, which in turn is packaged into the 
chromosomal structure.
Isolated DNA, in contrast, is a free-standing 
portion of a native DNA molecule, frequently 
a single gene. Isolated DNA has been cleaved 
(i .e., had covalent bonds in its backbone 
chemically severed) or synthesized to consist 
of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA 
molecule. For example, the BRCA1 gene in its 
native state resides on chromosome 17, a DNA 
molecule of around eighty million nucleotides. 
Similarly, BRCA2 in its native state is located 
14
on chromosome 13, a DNA of approximately 114 
million nucleotides. 
(App. at 45-46a) (citations and cross-references omitted.)
The above conclusion ignores biological reality by 
assuming that native DNA exists solely in the form of 
large, contiguous chromosomes and that smaller strands 
of DNA are not natural. In fact, DNA naturally exists 
(for example during replication) within organisms in 
varying lengths that are much smaller than an entire 
chromosome, as assumed by the majority. It is entirely 
expected, for example, for a DNA molecule, smaller than 
an entire chromosome but comprising the entirety of the 
claimed DNA sequence, to exist in nature. Such a molecule 
would regularly be created within cells during replication, 
through normal mistakes in DNA transcription or through 
the cleavage of a covalent bond within the chromosome 
caused by a natural chemical agent. In fact, ironically, 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins apparently play a role in 
repairing just such cleavages. See Ashok R. Venkitaramen, 
Cancer Susceptibility and the Functions of BRCA1 and 
BRCA, 108(2) CELL 171 (2002). 
Given the differences between a chemist and a 
geneticist in appreciating the biochemistry of the cell, 
the majority decision introduces signifi cant confusion in 
determinations of patent-eligibility under § 101. 
D. The Federal Circuit Overrode a Majority of its 
Judges who Found Prima Facie Lack of Patent 
Eligibility
This Court made clear that determinations of patent-
eligibility are to be based on the ordinary meaning of 
15
§ 101 and the three exceptions recognized by courts for over 
a century: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas all of which, this Court held, “are consistent with the 
notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’” 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. The Court held that “the 
Judiciary [does not have] carte blanche to impose other 
limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the 
statute’s purpose.” Id. at 3226. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the Federal Circuit 
overrode the prima facie determination of a majority of the 
panel’s judges who found that “an isolated DNA sequence 
that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable 
subject matter.” (App. at 79a.) The concurring opinion, 
upon which the majority depended, did so out of a fear 
that this conclusion would disturb the expectations of the 
biotechnology industry. (App. at 82a.)
The concurring opinion and the dissent agreed that 
isolated DNA sequences of most or all of a gene were not 
‘markedly different’ from natural DNA sequences, as 
required by Chakrabarty. The concurring opinion, after 
stating that an invention must have more than structural 
differences from its natural counterpart to be patent-
eligible under §101 (App. at 75a), held that isolated DNA 
sequences of most or all of a gene did not meet this test: 
“Despite the literal chemical difference, the isolated full 
length gene does not clearly have a new utility and appears 
to simply serve the same ends devised by nature, namely 
to act as a gene encoding a protein sequence” (App. at 
79a). The dissent found that neither isolated short DNA 
sequences nor isolated sequences of most or all of a gene 
constituted patentable subject matter: “I respectfully 
dissent, however, from the court’s holding that Myriad’s 
16
BRCA gene claims and its claims to gene fragments are 
patent-eligible”. (App. at 94a.)
The concurring opinion overrode its holding on the 
application of the “markedly different” test in Chakrabarty 
to claims reading over isolated DNA sequences of most or 
all of a gene out of fear of upsetting settled expectation of 
the biotechnology industry. In doing so, it cited this Court 
in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002), stating “that courts must be 
cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled 
expectations of the inventing community. In that case, we 
made it clear that the doctrine of equivalents and the rule 
of prosecution history estoppel are settled law.” (citations 
omitted).
Unlike the situation in Festo, there is no settled law 
that holds isolated DNA sequences to be eligible subject-
matter under the 35 U.S.C. § 101. At best, expectations 
have been built around the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Offi ce’s interpretation that those sequences constitute 
eligible subject-matter. However, no deference is given 
to the Patent Offi ce’s interpretation as determinations of 
patent eligibility are pure questions of law. Arrhythmia 
Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Patent applicants know this rule well 
and would not confuse Patent Offi ce interpretation with 
settled law. 
The concurring opinion’s views of the effect of a 
decision holding that claims reading over DNA sequences 
of most or all of a gene are highly disputed. A recent task 
force established by the Secretary of Health concluded 
that patents have had little or no effect on bringing new 
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clinical diagnostics, such as those claimed by Myriad, 
to market. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, 
HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and 
Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests (2010). 
In fact, in all cases studied, non-patent holders were fi rst 
to market and the entry of the patent holder reduced the 
number of test providers rather than enhancing access 
or availability of a new test, Robert Cook-Deegan, et al., 
The Dangers of Diagnostic Monopolies, 458 NATURE 405 
(2009). 
The history of the sequencing of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, their subsequent patenting, and the 
introduction of genetic testing is illustrative of the complex 
environment in which patents operate in the fi eld of human 
genetics. The race to sequence these genes was highly 
competitive, with different teams publishing BRCA2 
results only a day apart. Myriad was not the fi rst to make 
diagnostic genetic testing for these genes available on the 
market but, when it did enter the market, it shut out what 
it viewed as competitors, including university laboratories. 
E. Richard Gold and Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In 
the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12(4) GENETICS IN MEDICINE 
S39 (2010). Contributions to the breast cancer mutation 
database, the Breast Cancer Information Core hosted by 
the National Human Genome Research Institute, were 
reduced both because of fear of being sued by Myriad 
and, after 2004, by Myriad’s unilateral decision not 
to contribute mutations it found to the database. Julia 
Carbone, et al., DNA patents and diagnostics: not a pretty 
picture, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 784 (2010). There is 
no evidence that patents did anything to enhance the 
development or improvement of clinical tests for BRCA1 
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and BRAC2, Gold and Carbone, supra. , and some evidence 
that it decreased patient access, Cook-Deegan, supra.
While settled expectations are relevant in certain 
situations, here those expectations were built around 
administrative practice, not legal rules, and may 
undermine, rather than enhance, innovation.
II. THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
WITH RESPECT TO THE SCOPE OF § 101
The decision of the majority in the Federal Circuit 
deviated in important respects from this Court’s decisions 
in Chakrabarty and in Bilski both by imposing artifi cial 
limitations on these decisions and by ignoring this Court’s 
admonishment not to introduce limitations in the Patent 
Act that do not appear from an ordinary reading of that 
statute.
As noted in section I.B., the majority opinion restricted 
this Court’s teaching in Chakrabarty that inventions 
must be “markedly different” from natural substances. 
Instead, the majority required structural difference, 
regardless of its relevance to the invention. The majority 
opinion implicitly recognized the diffi culty of its position 
when it held that snapping a leaf off of a tree would not be 
eligible subject-matter despite the fact that many bonds 
would necessary be cleaved in the process. (App. at 52a.) 
Nevertheless, the majority provided no explanation for 
why snapping the leaf would not be patent-eligible under 
its test. It is unlikely that such an explanation exists that 
would be consistent with this Court’s rulings.
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Further, as argued in section I.A., the majority 
decision ignores this Court’s warning in Bilski not to 
impose limitations on the ordinary meaning of the Patent 
Act as the majority restricted the test of patentable 
subject-matter in naturally-occurring organic chemicals 
to the cleavage of covalent bonds. Artifi cially reducing the 
assessment of patentable-subject matter to a single factor 
ignores the broad framework established by the Patent 
Act. While perhaps rendering the statute easier to manage 
by the courts, the imposition of arbitrary rules does not 
advance the general objective of the statute to promote 
science and technology and sows confusion when applied 
in contexts outside the case in question.
At a more general level, this appeal provides the Court 
with an opportunity to assess, for the fi rst time, claims 
covering naturally occurring molecules that have not 
been altered in such a manner as to change their function 
or utility. This Court’s holding in Bilski, which sets out 
the framework for this analysis, was recently followed 
in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 
F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In Classen, the Federal Circuit 
elaborated that the threshold test under § 101 was met if 
the claimed invention was both “within the general classes 
of § 101 subject matter and not manifestly abstract.” Id. 
at 1066. The majority in the Federal Circuit in the case 
under appeal undertook the fi rst part of this test—albeit, 
for reasons presented in section I.A. on the basis of a 
scientifi c error—but not the second. 
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CONCLUSION
Because of the uncertainty that the Federal Court 
injected into a critical area of federal law that extends 
across all of the life sciences as well as the confl ict between 
the decision of the Federal Circuit and those of this Court, 
the petition for certiorari should be granted.
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